In recent years, almost all systems using the linear feedback shift storage device (LFSR) 
Introduction
In 2004, the European Union initiated "the selection of a new streaming secret (eSTREAM)", which is analogous to the United States' formulation of "AES block density standards." Forty eight candidates were chosen after public screening, review and final selection process. Details were published in the May 2008 results report [1] [2] .
The HC stream cipher was proposed by Hongjun Wu who is works at the Institute for Infocomm Research (IIR) in Singapore. The encryption method uses two features of a large table (P and Q). A continuous stream of random numbers updates the look-up table which also includes the value of each unit. When the cipher text is completed, the contents of the table are completely updated twice. Using the P, Q table results in very high security, but at the cost of a decline in performance.
The HC stream encryption algorithm of Hongjun Wu proposed two versions of encryption, namely HC-256 and HC-128. These versions of the encryption device differ in key length, the initialization vector (IV) and the key mixing structure. HC-128 is proposed to increase efficiency, applicable for instances without the need for high security level environment and has higher performance.
According to Hongjun Wu, HC-256 (or HC-128) is well suited to modern use of streaming encryption. The main reason of which is to use two arrays tables to compose a key mixing each table has 1024 (or 512) 32-bit elements (the two tables respectively have 2048 (or 1024) elements). HC-256 (or HC-128) for each of the operation will produce a 32-bit key stream output and update one of the elements of one of the two tables. After every 2048 (or 1024) steps, both tables of elements will be fully updated.
Each step of the feedback and output functions of the internal operations have a high degree of independence, suitable for performance improvements arising from parallel processing. HC-256 encryption performance is about 4.2 cycles / byte. The initialization phase takes about 74 000 clock cycles (compared to general stream encryption algorithms, it is about 25,000 cycles
Step2.
So that P [i], Q [i] as follows:
Step3.
Repeat the key stream generation algorithm 1024 times, to update elements in tables P and Q. Each round of the loop updates an element in table P (or Q). Therefore, after the iteration of 1024 times, all elements in table P and Q are updated once. HC-128 key stream generation algorithm is as follows:
Algorithm 2-1 i = 0； repeat until enough keystream bits are generated. In the HC-256 algorithm, six different confuse functions operand using a variety of operations to achieve the full purpose of confuse, where x = x 3 ∥x 2 ∥x 1 ∥x 0 , a total of 32 bits. The following are the six confuse functions: 
 Secret array initialization list The formula (20) is used to initialize a array of W, then through array W, the tables P and Q are created. There are three steps:
Step1.
, IV i represents a 32-bit values.
Step2. So that P [i], Q [i] as follows:
Repeat the key stream generation algorithm 4096 times, to update elements in the table P and Q. Each round of the loop will be update an element in table P (or Q). Therefore, after 4096 iterations, the tables P and Q have all their elements updated once. HC-256 key stream generation algorithm is as follows: Algorithm 2-2 i = 0； repeat until enough keystream bits are generated.
Key stream generation algorithm is described above, where (23) and (25) is the feedback function, (24) and (26) is the output function, and the output is the key stream. HC of stream encryption algorithm has two proposed versions: HC-256 and HC-128. If the environment does not have high security requirements, you can sacrifice some security by using HC-128, in order to achieve a better encryption performance. In addition, because the HC algorithm initialization steps are comparatively long, it is not suitable for use where the in environments where the key and initial vectors are update often.
Implementation of Reduced Version of the HC-256
This is an implementation of HC-256 that maintains the key characteristics of the original HC-256, this reduced version of the HC-256 aids in ease of analysis. Table 3 -1 lists the differences between HC-256 and the reduced version of HC-256. In addition to the different parameters, this paper will design the confuse functions of reduced version of the HC-256 as follows: 
HC-256 Compared with Reduced Version of the HC-256
(29) to (32) where the "+" operator that "x + y mod 2 4 ", where 0 ≦ x, y <2 4 . In addition, x = x 3 ∥x 2 ∥x 1 ∥x 0 , x 3 ~ x 0 are all 1 bit. 
Secret Array Initialization List
Based on the size differences described above, the secret array initialization list of the reduced HC-256 version will be divided into three steps.
Step1. Use (33), we will expand the key and initial vector to the array W. Step2.
So that P [i], Q [i] as follows:
Repeat the key stream generation algorithm 32 times to update the elements in tables P and Q. Each loop iteration, there will be an update to an element in the P (or Q) table. Therefore, after of 32 iterations, all the elements in the tables P and Q are updated once.
The reduced version of the HC-256 key stream generation algorithm is as follows: Algorithm 3-1 i = 0； repeat until enough keystream bits are generated.
Key stream generation algorithm described above, where (36) and (38) is the feedback function, (37) and (39) is the output function, and its output is the key stream.
HC Stream Cipher for the Implementation of Distinguishing Attacks
So far, only a very small number of special attacks against the HC algorithms exist in literature and Wu's paper to distinguish the original attack is very complete, so this paper will be based on Wu's method to analyze the complexity of the reduced version of HC-256 for distinguishing attacks.
What are Distinguishing Attacks
Distinguishing attacks are when an unknown attacker collects a series of streaming data to determine the distribution probability of the random number output from a stream cipher.
We implement the attack described above, and collected 200, 400, 800, 1600, and 3200 streams, each for of the 100,000 distinguishing attack experiments in the case of a stream. Table  4 -1 shows the experimental results. As the number collected from streams increase, distinguishing attacks have higher chances of success. 
Design of HC-128 and Distinguishing Attack
The algorithm from the key stream of HC-128 can be generated in each output after 1024 iterations; the P and Q tables will be fully updated. The first 512 bits of the output is used to update the P table, and the output bits after 512 are used to update the Q table. Two table updates are similar, only occurring in a different order. Since they are equivalent, we focus on addressing table P going forward.
The key stream generated by the algorithms is known. If (i mod 1024) <512, then according to (10) and (11), this formula can be organized into the following:
By observing the first two groups of 1024 outputs, we can find when i = 1034 
where h 1 (x) and h 1`( x) represent two different functions, they also represent different S-box, and z j on behalf of P [j⿱12].
Since (43) contains a「+」 operation, , we use the Least Significant Bit(LSB) to analyze the randomness of the key stream.
While using i values satisfying 10 ≦ (i mod 1024) <511, we substitute the confusion function g 1 into (43) and transpose, to arrive at:
In , j represents the first j th bits of the LSB. To crack the password requires collection of a large number of key stream output, so you can find j ≠ i, and1024×α＋10≦i, j≦1024×α＋511, and meet the following type of , , ,
and .
Given (44) and (45) hold, we can use the following formula (46) to distinguish if the key stream output is generated from HC-128.
By finishing (44) and (45), we can get:
Then the above formula becomes: The H function represents an "80-bit input corresponding to the 1-bit output" S-box. x 1 and x 2 are two 80-bit inputs, x1=
, and represents the maximum number of bits over z from the second and last bytes of the value connected in series, for example, a 32-bit z value, has a total of 4 bytes, so is the second and fourth byte values concatenated together.
Theorem 4-1:
H is a "corresponds to m-bit input to the n-bit output" S-box. Assuming m-bit input and n-bit output are randomly distributed and m ≧ n, if there are two inputs x 1 and x 2 , the probability of H (x 1 ) = H (x 2 ) is 2 -m +2 -n -2 -mn .
Proof: If x 1 = x 2 , then H (x 1 ) = H (x 2 ). If x 1 ≠ x 2 , then the probability of H (x 1 ) = H (x 2 ) is 2 -n . If the probability of x 1 = x 2 is 2 -m , then the probability of x 1 ≠ x 2 is 1-2 -m . So the probability of H (x 1 ) = H (x 2 ) is 2 -m + (1-2 -m ) × 2 -n . From theorem 4-1, the probability of (47) is 1 / 2 +2 -81 (when m = 80 and n = 1). Also following is the probability of (46) 9 ) key stream to reach the goal of 2 164 tests. The above focuses only on the probability of the lowest bit to satisfy (46).Because the output of a key stream s i is 32-bit, if the other 31-bits satisfy (46) and can be used to perform distinguishing attacks. The attack complexity can be reduced to 2 151 . Conversely, the required key stream output can be reduced by 2 5 . Because the "+" operation in (43) will generate a carry situation, it must be able to find enough key stream output to implement distinguishing attacks and its complexity will be greater than or equal 2 151 . Therefore, by the analysis of lowest bit, we can find the lower bound of the attack complexity.
From the above analysis, the distinguishing attack needs at least 2 151 output for results. In the original design for HC-128, the author suggested replacing the key and initialization vector after the cipher produces 2 64 of each bit of the key stream (about 2 59 outputs) as a pre-emptive action to prevent distinguishing attack.
Design of HC-256 and Distinguishing Attack
The key stream generation algorithms in the HC-256 and HC-128 have the same characteristics. They update the table P and Qin the same way, only in different order, so the analysis here will focus on the table P updates of the generated key stream.
From the algorithm, (23) in the HC-256 key stream algorithm is more complicated than that in (10) of HC-128. In addition, there is an increase of a「+」 operation in the formula, and the function g 1 (16) in the HC-256 is more complicated than the function g 1 (3) of HC-128. The analysis of HC-256 and HC-128 uses similar methods. This approach uses the least significant bit (LSB) to avoid the "+" operator problems to and the required complexity lower bound in the implementation of distinguishing attack.
According to (10) and (11), these two formulas can be combined into:
By observing the first two groups of 2048 outputs of HC-256, we can find when i = 2058 
When i satisfies 10 ≦ (i mod 2048) <1023, the above results can be rearranged to collect s i terms to the left and h 1 terms to the right, and the least significant bit (LSB) is used to expand the g 1 function to result in the general formula (55).
For j ≠ i and 2048 × α +10 ≦ i, j ≦ 2048 × α +1023, can be:
By finishing (55) and (56), we get:
To obtain the probability of (57), we need to find the probability of (58). Where the H function represents a "138-bit input corresponding to the 1-bit output" S-box. x 1 and x 2 are two 138-bit inputs, x1 = ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ ， x2= ∥ ∥ ∥ ∥ . Using theorem 4-1, the probability of (59) is 1 / 2 +2 -139 . Then the probability of (57) The above focuses only on the probability of the lowest bit to satisfy (57), because the output of a key stream s i is 32-bit, if the other 31-bit satisfy (57) and can be used to perform distinguishing attacks. The attack complexity can be reduced to 2 256 . Conversely, the required key stream output can be reduced by 2 5 . Because the "+" operation in (43) will generate a carry situation, it must be able to find enough key stream output to implement distinguishing attack and its complexity will be greater than or equal 2 256 . Although there may be better distinguishing attack algorithms proposed, the complexity of attack will still be more than 2 174 . When HC-256 generates a 2 128 -bit key stream, it automatically replaces the key and initialization vector, so to implement distinguishing attack for HC-256 should prove infeasible.
Reduced Version of the HC-256 to Distinguishing Attack

The Number of Samples Required
In the previous section for the analysis of HC-256 complexity, we stated the probably of (57) is 1 / 2 +2 -139 . This signifies the key stream can identify as generated by HC-256 only after testing (57) 2 280 times. The value of 2 280 is estimated based on the following: We assume the distribution of the key stream output in the HC-256 is approximately normal distribution and use (61) to estimate the number of samples required.
μ and σ represent the mean and standard deviation of the target distribution in the stream. μ` and σ ` represent the mean and standard deviation of the distribution in the random stream. For normal distribution, μ = Np and σ = . Applied to (61) results in (62), where p represents the probability of (57) and N is the number of samples required. 
In , j represents the first j th bits of LSB and = )) mod 8
Similarly, when j ≠ i, and 16 × α +3 ≦ j <16 × α +5 or 16 × α +5 ≦ j <16 × α +7) results in
And
From (72) and (75) (or (73) and (76)), we can get:
The probability of (77) (or (78)) can be determined after solving (79) (or 80) 
The H function represents a "19-bit input corresponding to the 1-bit output" S-box. x 1 and x 2 are two x-bit inputs,
From theorem 4-1, the probability of (81) is 1 / 2 +2 -20 . And the probability of (77) (or (78) 3 ) leys stream outputs to be successful. This focuses only on the probability of the lowest significant bit to satisfy (77) (or (78)), because the output of the key stream s i is 4-bit, if the other 3-bit satisfy (77) (or (78)) can also be used to perform distinguishing attacks.
Attack complexity can be reduced to 2 43.4 and the required key stream output can be reduced by 2 1.6 . Because the "+" operation in will generate a carry situation, and must find enough key stream output to implement distinguishing attacks, its complexity will be greater than or equal 2 43. 4 . In addition, the above analysis only focuses on table P, but the reduced version of HC-256 produces the key stream output by alternating use of table P and Q tables to generate the key stream output. Therefore, to collect the key stream outputs, the distinguishing attack must be twice 2 45 complexity to complete, the final complexity i requires 2 46 , because in the key stream of resulting 2 46 output, only half (i.e. 2 45 ) is generated by table P. Because HC-256 has a unique key stream algorithm design which allows the tables P and Q to have a degree of dependency. so attack process cannot be made quicker through parallel processing.
Results of the Study
This study used a random stream from the C language built-in rand () function, but because the function is too small to generate the random stream cycle, so it is slightly modified in order to be able to apply to this study. Table 6 -1 shows the probability of success. Average time is based on the average of total experimental instances. For example, the reduced version of the HC-256 in the implementation of the number of samples N = 2 37 attacks, the total number of experiments is 19, spanning 28.5 days. The average execution is about 1.5 days per experiment. 
Security Analysis
A 65,547-bit key length is required to ensure the security of the HC-256 encryption method. HC's original author estimated the key cycles to be about 2 65546 . This article believes the key cycles to be about 2 65536 . (It is impossible to calculate the exact cycle; we can only generate a random key to provide an estimate.
In the HC key stream algorithm, if (i mod 2048) <1024, we know the range is 2048-bit (equal to 2 11 ). For generating each 32-bit key stream, there is a key of 2 11 × 2 5 = 2 16 = 65536. If the process is generating truly random case, the key period is up to 2 65536 . Compared to other candidate algorithms, this key can be used for a long period. In situations where a large number of re-initializations are not required, the HC-256 encryption algorithm will be suitable.
In the HC streaming encryption algorithm, the security of the main key relies on use of nonlinear feedback function to avoid information leakage at each step. The output of the HC cannot be predicted, so attackers cannot gleam additional related information from individual steps, thereby maintaining the security of the last generated key stream.
The most direct impact on their safety of the key stream generation algorithm is two arrays tables P and Q. Therefore, the main purpose is to initialize the program to completely disrupt the two arrays in a truly random way. In order to achieve real randomness, HC-128 repeats the initial steps1024 times, and uses the results to update the arrays. The HC-256 algorithm initialization runs 2048 times, to better ensure randomness. In the encryption algorithm, the key stream generation process seems very simple, mainly due to the original author's considerable preparatory work in the initialization step of HC.
Conclusions
This paper provides a complete discussion of the HC-256 distinguishing attacks, and also designed a reduced version of the HC-256 algorithm. Along with the analysis of the reduced version of HC-256 to implement distinguishing attacks, this research has provided a complete theoretical analysis. This study makes possible implementation of technology to circumvent HC using distinguishing attacks and verifies the effectiveness of the attack.
